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Abstract 
 
Unionists and politicians frequently claim that globalization lowers employment 
protection of workers. This paper tests this hypothesis in a panel of 28 OECD countries 
from 1985 to 2003, differentiating between three dimensions of globalization and two 
labor market segments. While overall globalization is shown to loosen protection of the 
regularly employed, it increases regulation in the segment of limited-term contracts. We 
find the economic one to drive deregulation for the regularly employed, but the social one 
to be responsible for the better protection of workers in atypical employment. We offer 
political economy arguments as explanations for these differential effects. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The question of a harmonization of labor standards is on the agenda of nearly all 
intergovernmental meetings on international trade, be it in the framework of the 
European Union, NAFTA, or WTO. Such labor standards comprise workers’ right to 
form unions, fix maximum number of working hours and protect against unjustified and 
mass dismissals – from a producer’s point of view thereby imposing additional 
production costs and threatening the international competitiveness of their firms. 
Consequently, international competition among producers in countries with 
heterogeneous labor standards may trigger a race-to-the-bottom (Sinn, 2001; OECD, 
2000, ILO, 2009). To prevent such development some international organizations (e.g. 
WTO, ILO) try to set minimum labor standards, but often do not have the necessary legal 
means to enforce them (see Krueger, 1996, on the missing enforcement of compulsory 
schooling laws to prevent child labor). As described in ILO (2009), the means of 
international enforcement are weak as they include only instruments of ‘social dialogues’ 
and ‘technical assistance’.2 In response, domestic politicians mainly from the political left 
typically demand a legally binding harmonization of labor standards above the minimum 
level, or argue even against further expansion of free trade.  
                                               
2
 The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted in 1998 and laid down in 
several separate conventions (no. 29, 87, 98, 105, 111, 138), covers only so-called core labor standards, in 
particular “(1) freedom from forced labor in the form of compulsory labor and slavery, (2) the abolition of 
exploitative forms of child labor that put the safety and health of children at significant risk, (3) equal 
opportunity in employment, and (4) fundamental union rights like freedom of association and collective 
bargaining” (Busse, 2004, p. 212). Thus, certain aspects of protection of employment are not covered. The 
ILO labor standards are summarized and introduced in ILO (2009).  
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This paper is among the first to test the claim that globalization leads to such a race-to-
the-bottom process that weakens workers’ employment protection. Using a panel on 
measures of globalization and employment protection of 28 OECD countries from 1985 
to 2003, we find a substantial influence of globalization on employment protection. A 
novelty is that this influence is found to differ both across the dimensions of globalization 
(economic, political, and social) as well as across the different labor market sectors 
(short-term contract and regular-contract workers). While the economic and political 
dimensions of globalization are shown to loosen protection of the regularly employed, we 
find that political and social globalization tighten the laws regulating the possibility of 
offering/extending limited- or short-term contracts. We argue that these differential 
effects by dimension of globalization and labor market sector are well in line with recent 
political economy models of international trade, which have three characteristics: 
lobbying of agents (workers, producers), credibility of politicians necessary to fulfill their 
transmission channel functions with respect to the agents’ opposing preferences, and 
taking into account the relative economic importance of the two labor market sectors.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes previous 
mostly empirical literature, illustrates more thoroughly the research gap to be filled, and 
articulates testable hypotheses that guide our empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the 
data on globalization, employment protection and the controlling variables that form part 
of the empirical model, which is introduced in the consecutive section. Section 5 presents 
the empirical results for the direct effects of economic, political and social globalization 
on workers’ employment conditions, while section 6 investigates how globalization may 
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amplify the pressure exerted by domestic economic or political conditions. The findings 
in this paper are finally discussed and concluded in section 7.  
 
 
2. Previous literature, contribution of this paper and hypotheses 
 
2.1 Previous literature 
Most theoretical models of international trade such as the ones by Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan (1995) and Stern (2003) predict that globalization lowers labor standards, 
supporting the race-to-the-bottom view.3 As already argued in the review by Brown 
(2000), free trade prevents passing the additional production costs of complying with 
certain labor standards on to the consumer, who has the possibility to substitute with 
cheaper imported goods. Therefore, in open economies these additional production costs 
have to be borne by the firms and their workers alone. The race to the bottom of labor 
standards is then the outcome of a prisoners’ dilemma game, in which the firm/country 
that deviates first reaps excessive profits/welfare gains from trade. However, trade 
theorists emphasize that such race to the bottom does not occur among small open 
economies – labor standards are then not able to spill-over across borders -, but well in 
the case of large countries or when small countries have formed large trading blocks that 
                                               
3
 Theoretical arguments may well go into the opposite direction, predicting the impact of labor standards on 
trade volume, see also Krueger (1996).  
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strategically interact. In the case of the economically advanced OECD countries, the 
latter arguments apply.4  
In contrast to the theoretical models that predict a negative relation between globalization 
with labor standards, existing empirical evidence is rather scarce and provides mixed 
results.5  
Most of the early empirical studies employ only flows of FDI as measure of economic 
globalization and focus only on core labor standards set by the ILO (see footnote 1), but 
not on general employment protection. Moreover, the research question is rather how 
costs of labor and social stability affect location decisions of investors, not how 
globalization affects the level of labor standards in a country (for an example, see Kucera, 
2002, and literature cited therein).  
One of the first contributions to empirically relate openness to trade, replacing FDI of the 
previous analyses, with some specific core labor standards appear to be Shelburne (2001), 
and Cigno et al. (2002): both groups of researchers find independently from each other 
                                               
4
 As an exception, Dimitrova and Tchipev (2004) develop a theoretical model in which more international 
capital mobility is associated with a stricter protection of workers’ rights, which then spills over to trading 
partners’ less regulated labor markets. However, they also predict that the effect of economic integration on 
labor standards depends on the endogenous policy response in that country, which, in turn, depends on the 
relative lobbying power of agents (unions and capital owners) and size of the economy: Small open 
countries will fare policies against the strongest lobbying groups, while large open countries are predicted 
to follow them. Thus, small open economies with weak unions will strengthen workers’ protection, while 
large open economies with weak unions are hypothesized to deregulate their labor markets.  
5
 Early empirical analyses on the effect of international trade on relative wages (skilled-unskilled) in the 
USA, wage inequality worldwide, wage stability for production workers, trade and freedom-of-association-
rights, trade and rights to non-discrimination, are described in Brown (2000).  
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that trade openness reduces the prevalence of child labor – abolition of child exploitation 
is one of the core ILO labor conventions.   
Busse (2004) uses this research as a starting point and extends it to incorporate also the 
remaining core labor standards covered by the ILO conventions. He finds in a fixed 
effects panel analysis of 71 developing countries from 1970 to 2000 that more openness 
to trade appears to lead to increased gender discrimination in the labor market, growing 
prevalence of child labor, and less unions rights (freedom of association). Providing the 
rationale for the deterioration of certain labor standards as national economies become 
more globalized, Busse and Spielman (2006) show in a panel fixed effects analysis of a 
world sample (1975-2000) that gender inequality in wages creates a comparative 
advantage in the production of labor-intensive commodities. Already ten years earlier, 
Rodrik (1996) identified long working hours and child labor (controlling for human 
capital) as determinants of having a comparative advantage in the production of labor-
intensive goods. While the empirical analysis by Busse (2004) is an important 
contribution to the literature on the impact of trade on core labor standard, it does not 
cover the effects on general employment protection.  
Turning to the question of union rights which comes closest to measuring general 
‘employment protection’ of adult workers against e.g. mass dismissals and exploitative 
work contracts, Dreher and Gaston (2005) find in a cross-section time-series of 17 OECD 
countries from 1980 to 1999 (with country fixed effects) that globalization adversely 
affects density and attractiveness of unions – as a consequence of, as they argue, their 
lower (relative) bargaining power. Testing several dimensions of globalization, one of the 
few empirical contributions making such a distinction, they find that this development is 
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driven by the social dimension of globalization – that includes worldwide 
communication, exchange of ideas, and homogenization of local cultures 
(‘Americanization’). In contrast, the economic and political dimensions do not appear to 
exert any impact. This is a noteworthy result given that most arguments that link 
globalization with deunionization are rather economic or political (see e.g. Wallerstein 
and Western, 2000). In this paper, we will equally distinguish between three dimensions 
of globalization, using an updated version of the index used in Dreher and Gaston (2005).  
In contrast, contradictory findings are reported in the preceding empirical studies by e.g. 
Wallerstein and Western (2000) or Golden (2000): Wallerstein and Western (2000) study 
the development of union density and coverage during the post-war period until 1992 for 
18 OECD countries: they find that, first, an increase occurred until the seventies, 
followed by a decline in the eighties, on average. Wallerstein and Western (2000) provide 
then verbal-descriptive arguments for why trade openness may have such a positive or 
negative impact. Similarly, in a cross-section of 15 OECD countries for the 1980s (1980-
1990) Golden’s empirical model (Golden, 2000) reveals a convergence of union strength 
towards a certain mean, in some countries developing even upwards, but a divergence in 
union density. In her study, this union development appears rather unaffected by growing 
economic integration (measured by trade openness and the absence of restrictions to 
capital mobility).  
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2.2. Contribution of this paper 
In the light of our research question, the main critique of these preceding studies is that 
none of them provides a direct linkage between the phenomenon ‘globalization’ and the 
economic outcome ‘employment protection’ through laws and administrative regulations: 
In particular, these studies focus largely on aspects of union strength – aiming to capture 
wage levels, wage inequality, and job security (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 1996; Fortin and 
Lemieux, 1997) as labor market outcomes of globalization – in other words, these studies 
merely assume a positive link between unionization and labor protection, but fail to 
empirically show that this link actually exists. 
In addition, these studies do not account for the multifacetedness of globalization, 
focusing on either trade or FDI, ignoring additional economic channels of globalization 
and their interplays. In addition, these studies entirely neglect the social and political 
aspects of globalization.  
Furthermore, the literature either largely neglects worker heterogeneity or focuses only 
on differential effects, if at all, for low-skilled and high-skilled workers. Finally, from a 
methodological viewpoint, most of these studies neglect the problem of potential 
endogeneity of international trade, as the study by e.g. Dewit et al. (2009) suggests.6   
Taken altogether, an issue that has not yet been in the focus of empirical studies on the 
effects of economic integration is legislation that aims at protecting average workers’ 
employment. In addition, previous studies have approximated international economic 
                                               
6
 Their empirical analysis for OECD countries with the same index of employment protection used in this 
study suggests that relatively stricter protection of workers’ rights deters foreign direct investment, and 
keeps domestic firms anchored in their home countries.  
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integration only incompletely. To fill this gap, this paper is the first to address the 
question to what extent globalization (in place of international trade) affects workers’ 
employment protection (in place of union power or child labor). While the violations of 
core labor standards employed in the previous literature (e.g. child labor) rather address 
differences between developed and developing countries, we use a measure of 
employment protection that varies even across economically and institutionally well 
advanced countries: employment protection of workers measures e.g. the difficulty of 
(unfairly) dismissing them, their rights for compensation payments, and their exploitation 
through ‘flexible contract’ arrangements. To take account of the economic phenomenon 
of a growing importance of temporary work contracts in the European economies, we do 
not only look at the protection of regular (mostly permanent-contract) employment, but 
equally analyze the effects for short-term contracts and temporary work agency 
employment. By using the sub-indices of the KOF Index of Globalization7, we take 
account of the multifacetness of economic integration that goes beyond simple trade 
openness and foreign direct investment flows; in addition, using this index allows us to 
study whether the effects of globalization differ across its various dimensions, namely its 
economic, social and political dimensions. A battery of robustness tests completes the 
empirical analysis.  
 
                                               
7
 See Dreher (2006). 
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2.3. Hypotheses 
As argued above, strict employment protection legislation comes at a cost to domestic 
firms, possibly leading to their competitive disadvantage. Arguably, producers will lobby 
for a reduction of employment protection the stronger, the more intense international 
economic integration is. In analogy to the weakening effect of international trade on some 
core labor standards (Busse, 2004), we expect economic globalization to weaken the 
more broadly defined employment protection of workers through labor laws. For social 
and political globalization, the effects on employment protection might not be the same, 
and our prediction is rather ambiguous. Dreher and Gaston (2005) find that the ‘social 
dimension’ of globalization leads to a decrease in union power; however, the diffusion of 
ideas and values across nations – either interventionist or market-oriented in nature – 
might well influence a society’s choice of the level of labor protection in either direction. 
The same ambiguity holds for the propagation of political ideas: A key aspect of political 
globalization is membership in international organizations, which often implies the 
signing of agreements to promote the integration of markets (e.g. the EU), but also to 
strengthen core labor standards (e.g. the ILO conventions). Put differently, such 
international organizations might either strengthen and trigger economic liberalization, or 
might help the international coordination and harmonization of labor standards, 
preventing a race to the bottom among economically well advanced countries. 
In a second step, we investigate whether the forces of globalization interplay with the 
economic and political condition a country is in, or whether the effects of globalization 
are independent from such developments at the local level. In particular, we test whether 
globalization aggravates the pressure to liberalize labor markets exerted by growing 
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unemployment spending. In addition, we conjecture that the adverse effects of 
globalization are diminished in case national governments are left-wing.   
 
 
3. Data  
3.1. Employment Protection Legislation 
For our analysis, we use the index of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL), Version 
1, provided by OECD for 28 OECD countries, from 1985 to 2003.8 The EPL is based on 
government information and measures, in general, the protection of workers against 
specific forms of economic and financial exploitation through their employers. 9  
For regularly employed workers, the relevant EPL index (‘EPL_reg’) measures the 
overall strictness of protection with respect to four areas: the difficulty of individual 
dismissals, notice and severance pay for no-fault individual dismissals, the overall 
strictness of protection against dismissals, and regular procedural inconveniences. Thus, 
this measure takes into account the possible reasons for an individual lay-off, the 
                                               
8
 The excluded countries are Iceland and Luxembourg with no observations of EPL. The included countries 
are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Rep., Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and 
the United States of America. 
9
 This index excludes aspects of mass dismissals that are taken into account in a more recent version of the 
EPL index (“Version 2”), which, however, covers a much smaller time span. The first time point of 
measurement of EPL version 2 is 1998, that of version 1 the year 1985. Notably, as stated in OECD (2004) 
p.102, the regulation of mass dismissals forms only an additional protection against a rather rare form of 
lay-off, and in many countries regulations of individual and mass dismissals are fairly identical.  
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regulation of advance notice and severance pay, trial periods, conditions under which lay-
offs are unjustified, and compensation payment in case of such unjustified dismissals. 
In contrast, for workers with fixed-term work contracts or employment through 
temporary work agencies (so-called atypical work contracts), EPL (‘EPL_temp’) captures 
the overall strength of restrictions on establishing and maintaining such temporary 
employment. OECD names the three areas covered by this EPL index ‘fixed-term 
contracts’, ‘overall strictness of regulation’, and ‘temporary work agencies (TWAs)’. 
These areas include the regulation of the number of possible renewals of fixed-term 
contracts, the maximum accumulated contract duration (in months), whether fixed-term 
contracts are generally permitted or restricted to certain industry sectors only, or 
restricted to certain types of work (e.g. to temporarily replacing a long-term sick worker 
or a worker on parental leave).  
Each PL index (EPL_reg, EPL_temp) ranges from 0 to 6 with continuous intervals, and 
higher values indicate a stronger employment protection of workers. In general, each EPL 
index is calculated as an average of points awarded to its specific sub-dimensions in a 4-
step aggregation procedure (see OECD Employment Outlook 2004 (OECD, 2004, 
chapter 2), and Table A8). Due to the four-step construction procedure of the index, small 
changes in the overall index may reflect considerable institutional changes: for example, 
a change from the oral notification of dismissal to a procedure where a written statement 
giving reasons must be provided and a work council must be notified increases the EPL 
index of regular employment by just 0.33 points (see also OECD (2004), p. 103 and 106; 
see also Table A8). Similarly, a move from restricting the number of (consecutive) short-
term contracts renewals to having no restrictions decreases the EPL for temporary 
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employment by only 0.125 points. Table A5 of the Appendix provides descriptive 
statistics of the indices of employment protection in OECD countries.   
An overview of the legal and institutional changes in OECD countries with respect to 
employment protection from 1985 on is reported in Table A6 in the Appendix. Table A6 
also illustrates in what directions these institutional changes influenced the two EPL 
indices of regular and temporary employment. The general impression is that, on average, 
since 1985 the EPL index has been falling – for either type of employment. However, in 
some countries specific labor market reforms had a neutral effect on the index (e.g. 
Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Sweden), while, contrary to the general 
impression, a few reforms even improved on workers’ employment protection (Australia, 
France, Great Britain, New Zealand). Notably, the effects of these labor market reforms 
are not even heterogeneous across countries or time, but also within a country across 
types of employment. For example, Finland and Portugal appear to have liberalized the 
regular employment sector, while the employment protection index for temporary 
employment remained unaffected. The exact opposite observation is made for Germany, 
Italy and Japan, in which only the protection of the temporarily employed was lowered.  
 
3.2. Globalization: economic, political and social dimensions 
Globalization is measured by the annual KOF Globalization Index developed by Dreher 
(2006), which measures the degree of globalization from 1970 on, on a 0 to 100 scale. Its 
three sub-indices cover a country’s economic, political, and social dimensions of 
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globalization – all three dimensions contribute with equal weights to the overall index of 
globalization.10  
Economic globalization includes not only the traditional aspects of cross-national flows 
of goods and services, but also measures of foreign investment (direct, portfolio), the 
absence of traditional barriers to trade and capital flows, as well as indicators of 
internationalization of a country’s labor force. The political dimension of globalization is 
captured mainly by a country’s number of memberships in international organizations, 
foreign embassies, and participations in UN peace missions. Finally, social globalization 
aims at measuring the spread and exchange of ideas, values, images and people. This 
aspect is captured by, for example, fast food chain prevalence (as indicator of U.S. 
culture influence), cross-national trade in books and newspapers, but also international 
tourism and number of internet users. Overall, aspects of social globalization can be 
grouped into ‘personal contacts’, ‘information flow’ and ‘cultural proximity’ (see also 
Dreher and Gaston, 2005).  
Table A5 of the Appendix provides descriptive statistics of the globalization measures in 
our sample of OECD countries, which all endorse the principles of free trade. The index 
of economic globalization has a considerably large mean of 73.5 points, but ranges still 
from 37.8 to 96.0, resulting in a standard deviation of 12.5. The development of 
globalization is not uniform in our sample: the speed by which a nation opened it self 
abroad economically (as well as politically and socially) varies by country and world 
region, even among OECD member states which share, by definition of their 
                                               
10
 The index is now widely used, e.g. by Aidt and Gassebner (2007), Torgler (2007), Gemmell, Kneller and 
Sanz (2008) and Lamo, Pérez and Schuknecht (2008). 
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membership, similar economic and political institutions. The following graph depicts the 
development of the economic dimension of globalization in the OECD from 1980 on, for 
four different geographic-cultural regions: anglophone countries with strong free-trade 
traditions (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Great Britain, Ireland, USA), Western 
European continental countries11, a group that overlaps largely with core-EU member 
states, Eastern European, mostly post-communist countries (Poland, Slovakia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Greece), and a heterogeneous group of remaining countries (Korea, 
Mexico, Japan, Turkey).  
Graph 1 shows for all four geographic areas a steady increase in economic globalization 
from 1970 to 2006. Contrary to expectations, the Western-European countries (pink line) 
are nearly as globalized as the Anglophone countries (dark blue line) over the whole time 
span, suggesting that differences in national political ideology are not approximated by 
differences in economic integration. Thus, in both geographic groups did the levels and 
the change over time develop in a fairly identical fashion (from about 55 points to 
roughly 80 points). Different is the situation for the group of ‘other’ core OECD 
countries (turquoise line): they start at a considerably lower level of economic 
globalization (30 points), but grow continuously achieving a substantially higher level in 
2003 (60 points). In other words, the quite constant distance from the two Western 
geographic areas (of about 30 points) indicates that growth rates are quite similar across 
the core OECD countries. This is also reflected in the roughly parallel development of the 
three corresponding lines in Graph 1 – however, please note that the small unparalleled 
                                               
11
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and Switzerland.  
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‘blips’ and ‘drops’, which are unique to one geographic area, and also the crossing of the 
dark-blue and pink curves suggest that variation in the data for these core OECD 
countries is not only cross-sectional (= constant distance between lines), but also across 
time ( = local differences in steepness), even when the model includes time fixed effects 
that take out the common development pattern.  
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Graph 1: Development of Economic Globalization 1970 - 2007 
 
In contrast, in Eastern European countries (yellow line) economic globalization remained 
at a fairly stable level of around 50 points prior to 1991, still under the old communist 
regime, but then, after the regime change, took off, growing at a higher speed compared 
to the three remaining geographic regions, as the steepness of the yellow line indicates. 
Roughly around the year 2000 this catching up-process ended, and from then on the 
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globalization levels for Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the Anglophone countries 
appear quite equalized (around 80 points). To take account of the special development of 
these post-communist countries, the robustness test in section 5.7. estimates our model 
for the smaller sample of core OECD countries.  
 
3.3. Controlling variables 
In this analysis, as controlling variables we also employ data on unemployment rate, 
unemployment benefit spending (as share of GDP), population size, and national income 
(GDP), its 5-year growth rate, all obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicator (WDI) database (World Bank, 2007). Furthermore, we measure the political 
leaning of the government in two different ways. First, we use a dummy indicating a left-
wing government, which has been constructed from data available in the updated version 
(2005) of Beck et al. (2001). Second, we use the index developed in Bjørnskov (2008), 
which is based on the number of seats held by the parties in government and, thus, 
continuous. This index of government ideology ranges between the values -1 and 1, 
where -1 indicates a fully left-wing government, and 1 a right-wing government. 
Although the maximum number of observations is 486 country-years, due to some 
missing values in the remaining explanatory variables, we obtain an unbalanced panel 
with a maximum of 480 observations. For further descriptive statistics, see Appendix 
Table A5. 
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4. Model  
In our model we view employment protection legislation in country i at time t (EPLit) as a 
function of globalization in the same country (GLOBit), and a set of country-specific 
controlling factors (Xit) that might be correlated with both the focal variable and the 
dependent variable. Country (FEi) and year (Tt) fixed effects account for unobserved 
country heterogeneity due to time-invariant national characteristics (such as certain labor 
market regulations and features of the insurance system) and year-specific (but country-
unspecific) factors (such as world-wide economic shocks). A preliminary Hausman test 
rejected the random effects specification in favor of the fixed effects model, which we 
employ. An F-test of joint significance indicates that the year effects should not be 
omitted from the equation.12 An error term (eit) completes the model. 
Potential simultaneity might bias the estimated coefficient vector. We address this issue 
by employing country fixed effects and lagging the explanatory variables by two 
periods.13 This specific lag structure is chosen on theoretical grounds, particularly 
because in most OECD countries the legislature period is four years, so that a 2-year lag 
might account for the duration of the legislating process and politicians’ response time to 
changes in their party majorities triggered by new economic developments, particularly 
changes in the degree of globalization. Furthermore, as robustness test for the effects of 
                                               
12
 A Tobit model would yield inconsistent estimates due to the inclusion of fixed-effects. 
13
 Lack of suitable instruments does not allow for testing the exogeneity assumption. Although the 
dependent variable may be viewed as truncated below 0 and above 5, a fixed effects estimation using 
unconditional Tobit might yield biased estimates.  
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globalization we estimate a more parsimonious model that excludes some of the 
potentially endogenous determinants. The complete model looks as follows:  
 
EPLit = GLOBit-2 + Xit-2 + FEi + Tt + eit                                                             (1) 
 
The vector Xit-2 contains the following controlling variables: first, the unemployment rate 
and unemployment spending (in log), as a pressure to loosen employment protection 
might not only emerge from international competition, but also from the situation in the 
domestic labor market, and its economic impacts on social security systems and the 
government budget. We furthermore control for the 5-year GDP growth rate and national 
income, as faster growing and richer countries are more likely to have strong unions, 
possibly leading to stricter employment protection (see Dreher and Gaston, 2005; 
Wallerstein and Western, 2000). Vector Xit-2 also includes the logarithm of the population 
size that accounts for the size the domestic market, with a larger domestic demand 
possibly implying less ‘need’ for domestic firms to internationally expand and hence 
lower competitive pressure by foreign competitors on domestic labor standards. Based on 
the arguments in Wallerstein and Western (2000), the set of controlling factors is 
complemented by a measure of government ideology, as we conjecture left-wing 
governments to prefer protecting workers to a greater extent than center- or right-wing 
governments. The exact definitions of the variables in the empirical model are provided 
in Table A5.     
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5. Results 
 
In general, the results of our estimations confirm our predictions made above. In Tables 1 
and 2 we find empirical support for our hypothesis that overall globalization impacts 
workers’ employment protection. In particular, according to Table 1, the protection of 
regular employment appears lowered, while Table 2 suggests that protection of the 
temporarily employed is strengthened.  
 
5.1. Regular Employment 
For the regularly employed, we find the protection-lowering effect of overall 
globalization (Table 1 column 1) to be driven by its political and economic dimensions. 
Both exert a significant negative impact on employment protection – independently as 
well as when simultaneously included in the regressions (Table 1 columns 2 to 5). 
Simultaneous inclusion lets us rule out the possibility that one dimension simply proxies 
the other in the single dimension regressions (Table 1, column 2).14 In contrast, the social 
dimension of globalization, the world-wide dissemination of ideas through the media, 
does not appear to contribute to this phenomenon (Table 1 column 5). For the regular 
employment sector, a simple comparison of the estimated coefficients indicates that 
economic globalization has quantitatively the largest effect on employment protection. 
The size of the effect is quite considerable: an increase in economic globalization 
(running from 0 to 100) by 10 score points lowers employment protection by roughly 0.1 
                                               
14
 The dissimilarity of coefficients on globalization measures across models 2, 3, 4, and 5 suggests that the 
three dimensions do not approximate each other in the single-dimension regressions, despite of their 
considerable correlation, particularly of the economic dimension with the political one (rho = 0.72).  
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points – a change in EPL that could be triggered by e.g. liberalizing the dismissal 
procedure from one in which a third party approval is required to a regulation according 
to which only a simple notification of a work council is needed (decreases EPL by 0.15 
points).  
Taken the results of Table 1 together, mainly economic, but to some extent also political 
globalization appear to weaken the laws protecting regular employment. This finding is 
in support of traditional and political economy models of international trade suggesting 
that fiercer international market competition makes domestic firms lobby for more 
domestic labor market flexibility.  
 
5.2. Fixed-term contracts and other forms of atypical employment 
In contrast, Table 2 shows that protection of fixed-term and temporary-work-agency 
(TWA) employed workers (‘atypical contracts’) is enhanced by globalization, measured 
by its general index (column 1). However, this time it is not the economic dimension of 
globalization that gives rise to this finding, which exerts a negative but (statistically only 
weakly significant) effect (Table 2 columns 2 and 3). Instead, it is the social and political 
dimensions of globalization that strengthen employment protection (Table 2, columns 4 
and 5), outweighing the labor standards lowering effect of economic globalization. 
However, this positive effect of overall globalization is dominated by its social 
dimension: The estimated coefficients in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 show that the social 
dimension dominates the political dimension (0.018 versus 0.009). Again, an increase in 
globalization of 10 points would result in an substantial increase in EPL for ‘atypical’ 
forms of employments that mirrored, for example, restricting the number of contract 
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renewals, or changing the maximum of cumulated contract duration from ‘no limitation’ 
to ‘24 months’ (= + 0.125 points). Column 2 includes all three dimensions of 
globalization. It confirms the preceding single-dimension analyses, i.e. the positive net 
effect of globalization on protection of temporary employment, being driven entirely by 
its non-economic dimensions (social and political).  
Taken the results of Table 2 altogether, we find that globalization in its social dimension, 
namely the international exchange of ideas and people, puts an upward pressure on 
protection of workers with ‘atypical’ contracts. In contrast, the economic dimension 
equally appears labor standards lowering, albeit statistically weak. In contrast, social 
globalization is strongest for the more vulnerable temporarily employed workers. Tables 
1 and 2 suggest that political globalization influences both labor market sectors, but into 
opposite directions.  
 
5.3. Controlling variables 
Turning to the effects of our controlling variables, we observe some similarities and some 
dissimilarities across the two different labor market segments. For both segments, more 
populous countries tend to protect their workers better, while economic growth does not 
appear to play a decisive role. For regular employment, supporting our reasoning above, 
we also find that left-wing governments tend to support a higher level of employment 
protection (at least at the 5 percent level). In tendency, this effect is also observable for 
temporary employment, albeit statistically much weaker. The same result is found when 
we employ a continuous variable as alternative measure of government ideology in lieu 
of the dummy variable (Tables 1B and 2B). Tables 1 and 2 also show that a larger burden 
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of unemployment spending in the economy, measured as share of GDP, exerts a pressure 
to deregulate labor markets for both regular and temporary employment sectors, as 
predicted. The negative correlation between the generosity of unemployment benefits and 
employment protection was already reported in OECD (2004) (reprinted as Table A7). 
Finally, we find that richer countries protect temporarily employed workers better, as 
predicted. In contrast, the protection of regularly employed laborers is lower in richer 
countries, possibly because higher incomes serve as risk premium in a neo-classical 
sense.  
 
5.4 Summary of main findings 
Apparently, our analyses of the direct effects of globalization on employment protection 
show that the economic forces of globalization and international competition lower 
protection of both regular and temporary employment, albeit less strongly. In contrast, it 
is the social dimension of globalization that is most decisive for a stronger protection of 
employees with ‘atypical’ work contracts. Political international integration affects both 
labor market segments likewise: it works in the same protection lowering direction as 
economic globalization for regular employment, but strongly in the opposite direction for 
temporary employment, contributing to the positive impact of international 
connectedness.  
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5.6. Discussion of main findings 
5.6.1. The political economy perspective 
One possible interpretation is that domestic politicians and unions trade off the 
detrimental effects of globalization in one sector with stronger protection in the other 
sector, at least during the years 1985 to 2003. This is an extremely interesting conjecture, 
given that the share of the active labor force with temporary employment and atypical 
work contracts has increased over the last 20 years in developed countries, possibly due 
to the growing need for more labor market flexibility and lower wage levels. To illustrate, 
e.g., according to Franco and Winqvist (2002), in the EU-15 the share of temporary 
employment in total dependent employment has risen from 4 percent in 1983 to 15 
percent in 2007.15 Hence, it may well be that producer-supporting politicians buy support 
of the electorate for labor market deregulation in the (traditional and economically more 
important) regular employment sector by granting stronger employment protection in the 
‘younger’ temporary employment sector, – a strategy, which, given this latter sector’s 
minor economic importance, still leads to an increase in overall labor market flexibility.  
From a theoretical political economy viewpoint, the observation that globalization exerts 
a protectionist impact on one labor market sector, but a deregulative one on the other, can 
be explained by linkage politics. This phenomenon was first described in the political 
science and political economy literature on international negotiations between two 
                                               
15
 Recent numbers for Germany (2008) indicate that the share of regularly employed (permanent contracts 
with at least 20 working hours per weak) has declined since 1998 from 72,6% to 66%, while the share with 
‘atypical’ contracts has increased from 16,2% to 22,2%. The same study reveals that the atypically 
employed earns only about 2/3 of the wage of a regularly employed (see Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009). 
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countries. Stein (1980), argues that consent to a specific reform or treaty that benefits one 
group (here: the producers) can be reached by linking the decision to reciprocal consent 
on a second reform that benefits the other group (here: the workers/the unions). Mayer 
and Riezman (1987) take a more formal approach and find that such policy mixtures (two 
interlinked reforms) constitute an equilibrium outcome of a bargaining game between 
two players, which makes both players better off compared to a situation without an 
agreement and without any reform.  
This ‘linkage politics’ interpretation above rests on the general assumption that the 
employment protection increasing effect of globalization is driven by union and worker 
preferences, whereas the employment lowering effect is triggered by producer’s lobbying 
activities – transmission channels this study is not able to account for directly, due to 
their nature of non-observability. In other words, this interpretation assumes that the 
lobbying pressure exerted by producers is the stronger, the fiercer international 
competition and economic globalization is. In contrast, the lobbying pressure exerted by 
unions or the dependently employed rises with exposure of a wider public to the forces of 
globalization – reflected in the social dimension of globalization: To some extent, people 
may mainly experience or become aware of globalization through own cross-national 
travel and information exchange through mass media and the internet; notably, without 
this international communication infrastructure, the existence and success of non-
governmental organizations such as attac, Greenpeace or Amnesty International would be 
unthinkable.  
Thus, the analyses of the three single dimensions of globalization appear to support this 
‘policy mixture’ interpretation of the opposing effects of globalization: we find that it is 
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the economic dimension, the integration into the world product market, which lowers 
employment protection in the economically dominant labor market segment of the 
regularly employed. On the other hand, it is the social dimension, the cross-national 
connectedness among people and specifically workers (majority of the population), that 
drives the protection strengthening effect in the temporary employment segment.  
That the political dimension of globalization is found relevant for both processes (in 
opposing directions) is in congruence with the view that policy-making by politicians 
serves as transmission channel of the preferences of both antagonists in the globalization 
game (producers – workers): in a political-economy view, political globalization may 
give rise to politicians’ transmission channel functionality, as one of politicians’ 
commitment device constitutes the signing of international treaties , which increases the 
credibility of their promises and the actual likelihood of realization at the national level 
(Dreher and Voigt, 2008). To illustrate, the EU-Maastricht treaty is often viewed as such 
commitment and enforcement device that aided national politicians to cut budgets and 
reduce debts even in countries with traditionally ‘spending-friendly’ governments (Italy, 
Greece).16 
 
5.6.2. The classical economics perspective 
An alternative, but less convincing, explanation may be that this policy mixture is chosen 
by politicians to deliberately set incentives for employers that are overall welfare-
improving: politicians might increase regulation in the temporary-contract sector with the 
                                               
16
 See Fatás and Mihov (2003) for a survey. 
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intention to make employers not substitute regular employment with short-term 
contract/TWA positions. This argument rests on the fact that, even though employment 
protection for the regularly employed has declined over the last years, their job security 
still remains substantially higher than that for those in ‘atypical’ employment. In general, 
one can expect the working population to have a preference for employment in regular 
and permanent positions as opposed to limited-term or TWA employment. One weakness 
of this argument is that it cannot well explain why in our empirical analysis economic 
globalization exerts no effect on the temporary-employment sector. In addition, we find 
this explanation also less convincing from a theoretical point of view: we would have to 
assume that politicians act as ‘benevolent dictators’ who aim at maximizing the societal 
welfare of their country - an assumption the political economy explanation above (5.6.1.) 
rejects. 
 
5.7. Robustness of findings 
We obtain results that are qualitatively similar (in terms of coefficient sizes and direction 
of influence of globalization measures) if a more parsimonious model is estimated that 
omits those variables that are potentially endogenous to employment protection, such as 
unemployment rate, GDP growth, and left-wing ideology of the government (see Tables 
A1 and A2 in the Appendix). Moreover, the findings are robust to estimating our models 
with a reduced sample that excludes the former communist countries Czech Republic, 
Poland, Hungary and Slovak Republic (see Tables A3 and A4); this test rejects the claim 
that our findings were driven by transition countries that, from 1991 on, underwent 
extreme changes in their economic international integration, as discussed in section 3.2. 
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The results are also qualitatively unaltered when we take the autocorrelation of the 
residuals into account or when we replace the dichotomous indicator of government 
ideology with a continuous measure (see Tables 1B and 2B).  
Our results remain also unaltered when we include union density as an additional control 
variable (see Tables 1C and 2C). Again, we find a negative effect of the overall index of 
globalization on protection of regularly employed workers, and an increase in regulation 
of the temporary-contract sector. Turning to the sub-indices of globalization, in line with 
our previous findings, the coefficients of economic and political globalization turn out 
negative and significant for the regular employment sector; in contrast to our findings 
above, also social globalization seems to exert now a negative influence on employment 
protection. For the ‘atypical’-contract sector, we find again that political and social 
globalization overcompensate the negative effect of economic globalization, yielding a 
total effect of overall globalization that is protection-increasing. 
 
 
6. The aggravating effect of globalization for employment protection 
 
The impact exerted by globalization might not only be direct, but also indirect. More 
specifically, the effects of domestic macroeconomic and political factors that weaken 
employment protection might be amplified through the pressures of the international 
market and international politics. Put differently, we can expect interplays of these 
domestic factors with the three dimensions of globalization. In the following we test this 
conjecture for unemployment spending and a right-wing ideology of the government - 
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both of which were previously found to lower employment protection, at least of the 
regularly employed. 
Tables 3 through 6 show the results of this exercise. In order to allow for statistically 
interpretable interaction effects between the measures of globalization and 
unemployment spending or government ideology, respectively, we center the variables in 
question. Moreover, we employ the continuous measure of right-wing government 
ideology by Bjørnskov (2008) in place of the previously employed dichotomous indicator 
for left-wing governments. The models with the odd numbers (1, 3, and 5) report the 
findings for the baseline specification of Tables 1 to 2, while the models with the even 
numbers (2, 4, and 6) add interaction terms to the empirical model.  
 
6.1. Globalization and Unemployment Spending 
In Table 3, unemployment spending lowers protection of the regularly employed in 
almost all model specifications. This finding was already observed in Table 1. Indeed, 
inclusion of the interaction term with globalization makes this result even more 
statistically robust. Again, both political and economic globalization are negatively 
associated with employment protection of regular workers (columns 1 to 4), while 
globalization in the social dimension exerts no significant influence (columns 5 and 6).  
In line with our hypothesis, we find negative (and significant) interaction terms between 
unemployment spending and the economic and political dimensions of globalization for 
the protection of the regularly employed (column 2 and 4). Thus, stronger linkages with 
international markets and international political organizations aggravate the pressure to 
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deregulate labor markets exerted by domestic macroeconomic structures such as a 
generous and budget-burdening unemployment benefit system.17  
Simultaneous inclusion of all measures of globalization and its interaction terms with 
unemployment spending confirms the results for the direct effects of economic and 
political globalization, but also for the interaction with economic globalization; however, 
not for the interaction with the political dimension, which is now insignificant. This result 
suggests hat the latter interaction approximated the one with the economic dimension 
(column 4),.18 Overall, the main finding of Table 3 is that in a globalized world 
particularly international economic linkages (and not so much the political ones) add to 
the pressure of a bad labor market performance to lower protection of regularly employed 
workers. 
Table 4 analyzes the same question for workers with ‘atypical’ work contracts. As in 
Table 2, it is the political and social dimensions of globalization that lead to an increase 
in regulation of the temporary sector (columns 3 to 6), while the economic dimension 
plays no role (columns 1 and 2). Again, unemployment spending is associated with lower 
employment protection in all regressions.  
The estimates of the interaction terms show that unemployment spending in its interplay 
with political globalization lowers the protection of the temporarily employed (column 
4). It also appears that social globalization equally aggravates the negative direct effects 
                                               
17
 Notably, as we have controlled for the unemployment rate, unemployment spending is also interpretable 
as a measure of generosity rather than sheer size.  
18
 Results are available on request from the authors. The estimates for political and economic globalization 
are -0.007 and -0.011, respectively, both significant at the 1 percent level. The significant interaction term 
with economic globalization is -0.005. 
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of unemployment spending on employment protection (column 6). However, a model 
that includes all three measures of globalization and their interaction terms 
simultaneously reveals that it is only the interaction with the political dimension of 
globalization that drives these results. The negative coefficient on the interaction term, 
however, is negligibly small, so that for a mean level of unemployment spending the total 
effect of political globalization on the temporarily employed remains positive.19  
Taken all together, Tables 3 and 4 show that globalization interplays with the domestic 
macro-economic condition: the employment protection lowering effect of unemployment 
spending appears aggravated by the forces of globalization – by economic globalization 
for the regularly employed and by political globalization for the temporarily employed. 
 
6.2. Globalization and Government Ideology 
Tables 5 and 6 include interactions between globalization and government ideology in the 
baseline model.  
For the regularly employed, Columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 5 corroborate the negative and 
significant direct effects of economic and political globalization and the insignificant 
effect of social globalization: these have all already been observed in Table 1. Analogous 
to Table 1, the direct effect of right-wing government ideology on employment protection 
appears negative and significant. Looking at the interactions between globalization and 
government ideology, we find that employment protection is reduced further with 
                                               
19
 Results are available from the authors on request. The estimate on political globalization* unemployment 
spending is -.007 (at the 10 percent level), while that on political globalization is .012 (at the 5 percent 
level) and that on social globalization is .0134 (at the 5 percent level).  
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increasing economic globalization, the more right-wing the government is. We find no 
such interaction effect for the political and social dimensions of globalization (columns 2, 
4 and 6).  
For the temporarily employed, again corroborating Table 2, only social and political 
globalization matter directly to their better protection (columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table 6), 
while government ideology per se plays no significant role (all of Table 6). Nevertheless, 
its interaction with the political dimension of globalization turns out significant. Political 
globalization is found to increase the strengthening effect of right-wing governments on 
the regulation of short-term work contracts (column 4) – from an alternative viewpoint, 
right-wing government ideology aggravates the protection increasing effect of political 
globalization.  
Taken all together, investigating the interplay between the political positioning of 
national governments and globalization, with respect to employment protection of 
permanent contract workers we find that right-wing governments respond more strongly 
to the forces exerted by economic globalization - as one would expect. Put differently, 
left-wing governments attempt to counteract the liberalization pressure exerted by 
economic globalization.  
For workers with atypical contracts, the protection-increasing effect of political 
globalization is re-enforced by a right-wing government. This result indicates that the 
‘policy mixture’ strategy (see section 5.6.1.) of particularly right-wing governments – 
namely to appease the work force and unions by stronger protecting the (economically far 
less important) ‘atypical contract’ employees – works the better, the stronger the political 
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international integration of a country is, namely the better the politicians can signal their 
credibility to the opposing interest groups. 
 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
This paper is among the first to empirically investigate whether globalization exerts a 
downward pressure on the protection of workers’ employment conditions. It is clearly the 
first contribution to account for the various dimensions of globalization, the economic, 
the political and the social one. It is also the first to differentiate between regular and 
temporary/TWA (‘atypical’) employment.  
Using a panel of 26 OECD countries from 1985 to 2003, we test for the impact of 
globalization in its economic, political and social dimensions on the strictness of 
employment protection legislation. We reveal that overall globalization lowers 
employment protection of the regularly employed, but tightens that of workers in 
‘atypical’ employment relations, stricter regulating the establishing, continuing, and pre-
mature ending of short-term work contracts. We argue that stricter protection of the 
economically less important group of short-term workers may serve as symbolic political 
act by vote-maximizing politicians intending to ‘buy’ workers’ acceptance of labor 
market liberalization for the regularly employed. 
The analysis for the single dimensions of globalization is supportive of this political 
economy interpretation: We find that it is mainly the economic dimension of 
globalization, possibly triggering producer’s lobbying activities, that lowers employment 
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protection for regularly employed workers, as predicted by international trade models. 
We also find that political globalization, possibly one of the transmission channels of 
producer preferences, adds to this downward pressure. However, for workers in limited-
term or TWA employment, economic globalization plays no significant role, while 
international social integration, making the common workers aware of the phenomenon 
of globalization through international travel and worldwide communication, strongly 
prevents such development. Again, political globalization (as transmission channel of 
workers’ preferences) appears to add to this upward pressure.  
Furthermore, we find that globalization aggravates the effects of domestic political or 
economic determinants of labor protection: The deregulative influence of adverse 
macroeconomic conditions is the larger, the more globalized a country is. This result 
holds for both sectors of the labor market, with the deregulative effects for the regularly 
employed enforced by the economic dimension, and for the temporarily employed by the 
political dimension. In line with common expectations, we find that right-wing 
governments decrease protection of the regular labor market sector the stronger, the more 
the country is integrated into the world market. In contrast, right-wing governments make 
regulation of the temporary employment sector the stricter, the more the country is 
globalized in the political dimension. We view the relevance of political globalization in 
its interplay with local economic and political conditions for increasing the protection of 
the ‘atypical’ and economically less important employments as another support for the 
political economy interpretation of our results, now suggesting that particularly right-
wing politicians trade off deregulation of one labor market sector by a stronger regulation 
of the other. 
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Overall, this analysis suggests that the economic and societal effects of globalization are 
not as clear-cut as some public discussions may suggest. The common intuition that 
globalization is detrimental to the well-being of the dependently employed can only be 
partly supported – it appears that workers in atypical employment contracts – commonly 
viewed as more vulnerable as compared to the regularly employed – even profit from the 
forces exerted by globalization. Our analysis also reveals that it is rather domestic 
economic and political conditions that are the main drivers of labor market liberalization, 
the impact of which is the stronger the more globalized a country is. Furthermore, our 
interplay analysis also suggests that the process of globalization is used as an argument in 
the political debate, so that, depending on government ideology, government response 
either aggravates or counteracts the effects of globalization. Our analysis also reveals that 
this government response does not necessarily follow traditional ideological lines, 
contradicting common views and simple truths. However, to identify the exact 
mechanism behind this development in greater detail, and to analyze whether these 
developments continue in a linear fashion beyond 2003, further research is needed.  
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Appendix   
 
 
Table A1: Parsimonious model, regular employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
log GDP (-2) -0.529*** -0.448*** -0.464*** -0.489*** 
 [4.26] [3.50] [3.64] [3.94] 
log Population (-2) 1.194*** 1.549*** 1.402*** 1.083*** 
 [3.44] [4.43] [3.91] [3.08] 
Economic Glob. (-2) -0.012***   -0.012*** 
 [5.45]   [5.28] 
Political Glob. (-2)  -0.004**  -0.004** 
  [2.33]  [2.29] 
Social Glob. (-2)   -0.004** -0.002 
   [2.15] [1.23] 
Observations 480 480 480 480 
Number of countries 28 28 28 28 
R-squared (within) 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.21 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 
2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year fixed effects (not reported). 
Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in 
brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
 
 
Table A2: Parsimonious model, temporary employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
log GDP (-2) 1.018*** 0.944*** 0.961*** 0.882*** 
 [3.19] [2.97] [3.06] [2.79] 
log Population (-2) 6.522*** 6.624*** 7.279*** 7.190*** 
 [7.29] [7.61] [8.22] [8.03] 
Economic Glob. (-2) -0.001   -0.004 
 [0.20]   [0.66] 
Political Glob. (-2)  0.009**  0.008** 
  [2.37]  [2.00] 
Social Glob. (-2)   0.016*** 0.015*** 
   [3.64] [3.46] 
Observations 480 480 480 480 
Number of countries 28 28 28 28 
R-squared (within) 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.35 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for temporarily employed workers (OECD, 
2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year fixed effects (not reported). 
Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in 
brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table A3: OECD countries with no communist past, regular employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
log GDP (-2) -1.643*** -1.664*** -2.091*** -1.344*** 
 
[4.51] [4.44] [5.31] [3.33] 
log Population (-2) 2.244*** 2.457*** 2.388*** 2.452*** 
 
[5.70] [6.14] [5.82] [6.18] 
Unemployment (-2) 0.000 -0.007 -0.007 0.000 
 
[0.03] [1.04] [1.11] [0.05] 
Unempl. spending (-2) -0.070** -0.034 -0.050 -0.051 
 
[2.03] [0.97] [1.43] [1.48] 
GDP Deflator (-2) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
[3.88] [3.85] [4.52] [3.03] 
Left-wing Govt. (-2) 0.040** 0.051** 0.040** 0.052*** 
 
[2.02] [2.53] [2.00] [2.62] 
Economic Glob. (-2) -0.011***   -0.012*** 
 
[4.00]   [4.51] 
Political Glob. (-2)  -0.006***  -0.007*** 
 
 [2.88]  [3.56] 
Social Glob. (-2)   0.002 0.002 
 
  [0.68] [0.89] 
     
     
Observations 370 370 370 370 
Number of id 22 22 22 22 
R-squared (within) 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.37 
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 
2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year fixed effects (not reported). 
Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in 
brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table A4: OECD countries with no communist past, temporary employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
log GDP (-2) 5.170*** 4.157*** 3.114*** 3.171*** 
 [5.12] [4.04] [2.97] [2.85] 
log Population (-2) 9.447*** 9.371*** 10.383*** 10.102*** 
 [8.65] [8.53] [9.49] [9.23] 
Unemployment (-2) 0.032* 0.022 0.013 0.022 
 [1.75] [1.25] [0.76] [1.25] 
Unempl. spending (-2) -0.170* -0.170* -0.13 -0.177* 
 [1.77] [1.76] [1.38] [1.86] 
GDP Deflator (-2) -0.000*** -0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 [3.10] [2.27] [1.15] [1.16] 
Left-wing Govt. (-2) 0.074 0.058 0.068 0.053 
 [1.35] [1.05] [1.26] [0.98] 
Economic Glob. (-2) -0.015**   -0.014* 
 [2.05]   [1.95] 
Political Glob. (-2)  0.009*  0.007 
  [1.71]  [1.36] 
Social Glob. (-2)   0.023*** 0.022*** 
   [3.80] [3.80] 
     
     
Observations 370 370 370 370 
Number of id 22 22 22 22 
R-squared (within) 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.47 
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 
2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year fixed effects (not reported). 
Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in 
brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table A5: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Definition Source 
      
  
Employment protection regular 401 2.19 0.96 0.17 5 Index from (0) to (5) OECD (2004) 
Employment protection temporary 401 2.19 1.59 0.25 5.38 Index from (0) to (5) OECD (2004) 
Economic globalization (-2) 401 73.49 12.47 37.75 96.04 Indicator from (0) to (100) Dreher (2006) 
Political globalization (-2) 401 79.93 12.95 39.41 99.00 Indicator from (0) to (100) Dreher (2006) 
Social globalization (-2) 401 67.86 16.93 19.83 92.04 Indicator from (0) to (100) Dreher (2006) 
Log GDP (-2) 401 9.90 0.35 8.54 10.46 National income WDI (2007) 
Log Population (-2) 401 12.13 1.20 10.42 14.86 Population WDI (2007) 
Unemployment rate (-2) 401 8.43 4.08 1.60 23.90 Share of unemployed in active 
population 
OECD 
Statistics 
Log unemployment spending (-2) 401 0.11 0.80 -2.30 1.67 Unemployment spending as 
share of GDP 
OECD 
Statistics 
5-year GDP growth (-2) 401 0.11 0.09 -0.16 0.51 (GDP – GDP(-5))/ GDP(-5)  
Left-wing government_(-2) 401 0.45 0.50 0 1 Dummy variable. Beck et al 
(2001) 
Right-wing government_(-2) 401 0.26 0.36 -0.57 1 Continuous measure Bjørnskov 
(2008) 
Year 401 1994.98 5.30 1985 2003   
Notes: based on regression sample of Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table A6: Break points of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indices 
 
 
 Reform description EPL overall EPL regular 
contracts 
EPL temp. 
contracts 
Australia 1996 Workplace Relations Act 1996 set out factors that Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission must have regard to when 
determining whether a termination is unfair 
+ + = 
 
2004 The scale for employers with 15 or more employees has also 
increased in March 2004 (the small business exemption to 
severance pay has been removed, now requiring employers 
with less than 15 employees to pay). 
+ + = 
Austria 2003 Employees Income Provision Act eliminated severance paid 
and integrated into individual saving accounts accessible 
during unemployment spells 
- - = 
Belgium 1997 Restriction on TWA were reduced and FTC were made 
renewable  - = - 
 
2000 Tightening of rule concerning notice period and 
compensation in case of unjustified dismissal for blue collar 
workers 
= = = 
 
2002 The maximum total duration of TWA was lengthened for 
contracts justified by temporary increase in work-load (Dec. 
2001) 
= = = 
Canada  No changes    
Czech Republic  No changes    
Denmark 1995 Since the mid-1990s the role of TWA has been recognized 
by social partners and their scope increased - 
= 
- 
Finland 1991 The delay before notice can start was shortened from 2 
months (as set in the Act on the Dismissal Procedure) to 1-2 
weeks (as set in the Act of Employment Contracts) 
- - = 
 
1996 Notice period was halved for workers with tenure less than 1 
year - - = 
 
2001 The new employment contract act came into force reducing 
notice periods further - - = 
France 1986 Prior administrative authorization for dismissals for 
economic reasons was abolished - - = 
 
1990 The list limiting the circumstances in which the use of FTC 
and TWA is permissible is restored and the maximum total 
duration of FTC and TWA was reduced 
+ = + 
 
2001 Severance pay entitlements were increased = + = 
Germany 1985 FTC were allowed without specifying an objective reason    
 
1993 Notice period for blue collar workers was extended and 
aligned with that of white collar workers = + = 
 
1994 TWA legislation was loosened 
- = - 
 
1996 The renewal period for FTC and TWA and admissible 
frequency of renewals were increased - = - 
 
2002 Maximum total duration of TWA was brought to 24 months 
- = - 
 
2004 The limit on the maximum total duration of TWA was lifted. 
(from 1. Jan 2004) - = - 
Greece 1990 Notice period or severance pay entitlements were reduced 
(law 1989) amending law 3198/55 of 1955) - - = 
 
2003 National General Collective Labour Agreement (2002-2003) 
changes dismissal rules and raises slightly entitlements to 
severance pay 
- - = 
 
2003 PD 81/2003 changes FTC and TWA 
- = - 
Hungary 2003 The amended labour code introduced stricter regulations on 
renewal of fixed term contracts + = + 
Ireland 2003 The Protection of Employees act tightened regulation on 
valid cases for FTC and limited their maximum overall 
duration to 4 years  
+ = + 
 
2003 The Redundancy Payments Bill (dismissal laws) raised 
severance pay entitlements = = = 
 
Notes: Source: OECD (2004), pp.119-120. The equal sign indicates that the change in a sub-item was not 
large enough to be visible in the overall EPL index ; ‘-’ (‘+’) indicates less (more) protection. 
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Table A6: Break points of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indices (contd.) 
 
 
 Reform description EPL overall EPL regular 
contracts 
EPL 
temp. 
contracts 
Italy 1987 Fixed term contracts use was widened through collective 
agreements specifying target groups and employment shares = = = 
 
1997 Treu package on FTC widened the number of valid cases for 
the use of FTC - = - 
 
1998 TWA were permitted 
- = - 
 
2000 Reform of TWA 2000 extended the use of TWA and 
removed the restrictions concerning unskilled workers - = - 
Japan 1985 TWA were permitted for 13 occupations only 
 
 
 
 
1996 The use of TWA was extended to 26 occupations 
- = - 
 
1999 The use of TWA was extended to all occupations with some 
exclusions - = - 
Korea 1998 TWA were liberalized 
- = - 
 
1998 Dismissals for managerial reasons are allowed (i.e. 
redundancy and economic restructuring). Whereas this new 
law may be used for dismissing a single person for urgent 
business needs, it was mainly introduced with collective 
dismissals in mind 
- - = 
Mexico 
 
No changes 
   
Netherlands 1999 The flexibility and security law increased the maximum 
possible number of FCT and lengthened the maximum total 
duration of contracts with TWA 
- = - 
 
2001 The EU directive on fixed-term work came into effect 
reducing the maximum total duration of TWA contracts = = = 
New Zealand 2000 Employment relations act tightened the legislation on 
individual and collective dismissals + + = 
 
2000 Employment relations act also tightened the legislation on 
FTC and TWA + = + 
Norway 1995 TWA legislation was eased 
- = - 
 
2000 TWA legislation was further eased 
- = - 
Poland 2002 The new labour code lifted some restrictions in the use of 
FTC (from 2 renewals permitted to unlimited – until 
accession) 
- = - 
 
2003 A new law tightened regulations on temporary work 
agencies limiting the cases when TWA contracts are allowed 
and reducing their maximum total duration 
+ = + 
Portugal 1989 Firing restrictions were eased (dismissals for individual 
redundancy were authorised)    
 
1991 Firing restrictions were eased further (dismissals for 
unsuitability were authorised) - - = 
 
1996 A strategic social plan between social partners was agreed to 
widen the use of FTC and TWA - = - 
 
2004 New Labour Code came into force in December 2003 
- = - 
Slovak Republic 2003 A mew Labour code was approved that relaxed regulations 
on dismissal of regular contract employees and collective 
dismissals 
- - = 
 
2003 The new Labour code also increased valid cases for FTC, 
raised the number of possible renewals and the maximum 
overall duration of FTC 
- = - 
 
Notes: Source: OECD (2004), pp.119-120. The equal sign indicates that the change in a sub-item was not 
large enough to be visible in the overall EPL index ; ‘-’ (‘+’) indicates less (more) protection. 
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Table A6: Break points of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indices (contd.) 
 
 
 Reform description EPL overall EPL regular 
contracts 
EPL 
temp. 
contracts 
Spain 1984 Restrictions for FTC were substantially relaxed 
   
 
1994 Procedural requirements for dismissals for economic reasons 
were relaxed, notice periods shortened - - = 
 
1994 Rules governing renewals of FTC were tightened and 
temporary work agencies permitted - = - 
 
1997 Maximum compensation for unfair dismissal was reduced 
and some changes were made to the definition of fair 
dismissal 
- - = 
 
2001 Law 12/2001 tightened the rules governing valid cases for 
the use of FTC + = + 
Sweden 1993 TWA were permitted 
- = - 
 
1997 FTC were made possible without objective reason 
- = - 
Switzerland 
 
No changes 
   
Turkey 
 
No changes 
   
Great Britain 1985 The period of service to claim unfair dismissal increased to 2 
years    
 
2000 Trial period was halved + + = 
 
2002 Maximum total duration of FTC was reduced to 4 years 
(from unlimited) = = + 
United States 
 
No changes 
   
 
Notes: Source: OECD (2004), pp.119-120. The equal sign indicates that the change in a sub-item was not 
large enough to be visible in the overall EPL index ; ‘-’ (‘+’) indicates less (more) protection. 
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Table A7: Employment protection and generosity of unemployment benefits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, 2004, chart 1.  
 
Expenditure on unemployment defined as compensation divided by LFS unemployment. For the 
unemployment benefits per unemployed, Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.58** for permanent contracts 
and 0.59** for temporary contracts. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively.  
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Table A8: Construction of the Employment Protection Index (Version 1) 
 
 
EPL summary indicators at four successive levels of aggregation 
And weighting scheme 
Level 4 
Scale 0-6 
Level 3 
Scale 0-6 
Level 2 
Scale 0-6 
Level 1 
Scale 0-6 
Procedural 
inconveniences 
(1/3) 
1. Notification procedures 
2. Delay to start a notice 
(1/2) 
(1/2) 
3. Notice period after  9 months 
4 years 
20 years 
(1/7) 
(1/7) 
(1/7) 
Notice and 
severance pay for 
no-fault individual 
dismissals (1/3) 
4. Severance pay after 9 months 
4 years 
20 years 
(4/21) 
(4/21) 
(4/21) 
Regular contracts 
(version 2: 5/12)  
(version 1: 1/2) 
Difficulty of 
dismissal (1/3) 
5. Definition of unfair dismissal 
6. Trial period 
7. Compensation 
8. Reinstatement 
(1/4) 
(1/4) 
(1/4) 
(1/4) 
Fixed term 
contracts (1/2) 
9. Valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts 
10. maximum number of successive contracts 
11. Maximum cumulated duration 
(1/2) 
(1/4) 
(1/4) 
Temporary 
contracts  
(version 2; 5/12) 
(version 1: 1/2) 
Temporary work 
agency 
employment (1/2) 
12. Types of work for which is legal 
13. Restrictions on number of renewals 
14. Maximum cumulated duration 
(1/2) 
(1/4) 
(1/4) 
Overall summary 
indicator 
Collective 
dismissals  
(version 2: 2/12) 
(version 1: 0) 
 15. Definition of collective dismissal 
16. Additional notification requirements 
17. Additional delays involved 
18. Other special costs to employers 
(1/4) 
(1/4) 
(1/4) 
(1/4) 
 
 
Notes: Source: OECD (2004), p.106. Weights are displayed in round brackets. 
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Tables  
 
 
Table 1: Globalization and protection of regularly employed 1985-2003 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
log GDP (-2) -0.838** -0.711** -1.112*** -1.127*** -1.402*** 
 
[2.54] [2.18] [3.65] [3.60] [4.48] 
log Population (-2) 2.121*** 2.283*** 2.158*** 2.387*** 2.238*** 
 
[5.55] [5.99] [5.67] [6.19] [5.68] 
Unemployment (-2) 0.003 0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.000 
 [0.58] [1.15] [1.03] [0.12] [0.09] 
Log Unemployment spending (-2) -0.068** -0.076** -0.095*** -0.058* -0.075** 
 [2.24] [2.51] [3.14] [1.89] [2.44] 
GDP growth (-2) 0.000** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 [2.04] [1.87] [2.98] [3.02] [3.62] 
Left-wing government (-2) 0.054*** 0.059*** 0.047** 0.059*** 0.048** 
 [2.89] [3.21] [2.56] [3.11] [2.55] 
Globalization (-2) -0.015***     
 [4.03]     
Economic Glob. (-2)  -0.011*** -0.010***   
 
 [4.57] [4.12]   
Political Glob. (-2)  -0.007***  -0.006***  
 
 [3.71]  [3.15]  
Social Glob. (-2)  0.000   -0.001 
 
 [0.18]   [0.38] 
 
     
Observations 401 401 401 401 401 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26 
R-squared (within) 0.3227 0.3498 0.3239 0.3107 0.2914 
R-squared (overall) 0.32 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.29 
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 
2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year fixed effects (not reported). 
Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006), political orientation of the 
government is measured by a dummy for left-wing governments. Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. 
‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 2: Globalization and protection of temporarily employed 1985-2003 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
log GDP (-2) 3.769*** 3.932*** 5.083*** 4.165*** 3.883*** 
 
[4.13] [4.35] [6.03] [4.85] [4.63] 
log Population (-2) 9.447*** 9.492*** 9.100*** 9.049*** 9.787*** 
 
[8.94] [8.99] [8.63] [8.54] [9.28] 
Unemployment (-2) 0.011 0.023 0.025 0.016 0.014 
 
[0.69] [1.48] [1.59] [1.07] [0.96] 
Log Unemployment spending (-2) -0.142* -0.199** -0.156* -0.157* -0.153* 
 
[1.71] [2.37] [1.86] [1.86] [1.85] 
GDP growth (-2) -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
 
[2.28] [2.40] [3.74] [2.85] [2.43] 
Left-wing government (-2) 0.079 0.075 0.085* 0.07 0.090* 
 
[1.54] [1.48] [1.67] [1.35] [1.77] 
Globalization (-2) 0.022**     
 
[2.13]     
Economic Glob. (-2)  -0.013* -0.014**   
 
 [1.95] [2.05]   
Political Glob. (-2)  0.007  0.009*  
 
 [1.42]  [1.77]  
Social Glob. (-2)  0.018***   0.018*** 
 
 [3.31]   [3.33] 
 
     
Observations 401 401 401 401 401 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26 
R-squared (within) 0.4305 0.4511 0.4299 0.4282 0.4408 
R-squared (overall) 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.43 0.44 
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for temporarily employed workers (OECD, 
2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year fixed effects (not reported). 
Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in 
brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 1B: Globalization and protection of regularly employed 1985-2003 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
log GDP (-2) -0.537 -0.415 -0.944*** -0.871** -1.194*** 
 
[1.43] [1.11] [2.74] [2.41] [3.32] 
log Population (-2) 2.376*** 2.484*** 2.279*** 2.735*** 2.480*** 
 
[5.42] [5.64] [5.17] [6.10] [5.48] 
Unemployment (-2) 0.002 0.005 0.005 -0.003 -0.003 
 [0.39] [0.98] [0.92] [0.63] [0.46] 
Log Unemployment spending (-2) -0.055* -0.062** -0.087*** -0.042 -0.063** 
 [1.84] [2.05] [2.89] [1.37] [2.07] 
GDP growth (-2) 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 
 [1.03] [0.85] [2.19] [1.76] [2.52] 
Rightwing government (continuous) (-2) -0.088*** -0.095*** -0.074** -0.078*** -0.064** 
 [2.93] [3.22] [2.50] [2.59] [2.11] 
Globalization (-2) -0.016***     
 [4.32]     
Economic Glob. (-2)  -0.012*** -0.011***   
 
 [4.78] [4.30]   
Political Glob. (-2)  -0.007***  -0.006***  
 
 [3.81]  [3.21]  
Social Glob. (-2)  -0.001   -0.001 
 
 [0.58]   [0.61] 
 
     
Observations 396 396 396 396 396 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25 
R-squared (within) 0.3244 0.3523 0.3242 0.3085 0.2888 
R-squared (overall) 0.32 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.29 
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 
2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year fixed effects (not reported). 
Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006), political orientation of the 
government is measured by the continuous ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value 
of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  
 - 51 - 
 
 
Table 2B: Globalization and protection of temporarily employed 1985-2003 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
log GDP (-2) 4.608*** 4.579*** 5.991*** 4.982*** 4.895*** 
 
[4.47] [4.45] [6.31] [5.07] [5.11] 
log Population (-2) 11.158*** 10.802*** 10.708*** 10.563*** 11.379*** 
 
[9.26] [8.87] [8.81] [8.67] [9.45] 
Unemployment (-2) -0.004 0.008 0.011 0.004 0 
 
[0.30] [0.53] [0.72] [0.27] [0.03] 
Log Unemployment spending (-2) -0.123 -0.182** -0.133 -0.149* -0.125 
 
[1.51] [2.17] [1.60] [1.78] [1.54] 
GDP growth (-2) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
[3.52] [3.41] [4.86] [3.91] [3.90] 
Rightwing government (continuous) (-2) 0.096 0.096 0.046 0.087 0.081 
 
[1.17] [1.18] [0.56] [1.06] [1.01] 
Globalization (-2) 0.024**     
 
[2.31]     
Economic Glob. (-2)  -0.011 -0.012*   
 
 [1.47] [1.67]   
Political Glob. (-2)  0.010*  0.011**  
 
 [1.90]  [2.09]  
Social Glob. (-2)  0.016***   0.016*** 
 
 [2.93]   [2.93] 
 
     
Observations 396 396 396 396 396 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25 
R-squared (within) 0.4305 0.4511 0.4299 0.4282 0.4408 
R-squared (overall) 0.4413 0.4567 0.4373 0.4398 0.4465 
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for temporarily employed workers (OECD, 
2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year fixed effects (not reported). 
Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006), political orientation of the 
government is measured by the continuous ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value 
of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  
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Table 1C: Globalization and protection of regularly employed 1985-2003, controlling for union density 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
log GDP (-2) -2.752*** -2.735*** -3.336*** -3.321*** -3.488*** 
 
[5.83] [5.78] [6.92] [7.33] [7.53] 
log Population (-2) 0.746 0.930* 1.179** 1.349*** 0.721 
 
[1.63] [1.94] [2.51] [2.93] [1.45] 
Unemployment (-2) 0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.002 
 [0.61] [0.18] [0.15] [1.03] [0.25] 
Log Unemployment spending (-2) -0.01 0.012 -0.032 0.02 -0.018 
 [0.31] [0.37] [0.95] [0.60] [0.53] 
Union density (-2) -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.019*** 
 [8.68] [7.86] [6.59] [8.27] [8.03] 
GDP growth (-2) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 [5.54] [5.53] [6.12] [6.70] [6.84] 
Left-wing government (-2) -0.111*** -0.119*** -0.079*** -0.101*** -0.089*** 
 [3.75] [4.01] [2.64] [3.38] [2.93] 
Globalization (-2) -0.022***     
 [5.50]     
Economic Glob. (-2)  -0.006* -0.007**   
 
 [1.96] [2.43]   
Political Glob. (-2)  -0.010***  -0.009***  
 
 [5.12]  [4.60]  
Social Glob. (-2)  -0.007***   -0.007*** 
 
 [2.79]   [2.64] 
 
     
 
     
 
     
Observations 340 340 340 340 340 
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20 
R-squared (within) 0.48 0.5 0.44 0.47 0.45 
R-squared (overall) 0.485 0.4966 0.4433 0.4702 0.4451 
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 
2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year fixed effects (not reported). 
Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006), political orientation of the 
government is measured by the continuous ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value 
of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  
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Table 2C: Globalization and protection of temporarily employed 1985-2003, controlling for union density 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
log GDP (-2) 4.061*** 4.698*** 5.834*** 4.911*** 4.496*** 
 
[2.91] [3.41] [4.23] [3.70] [3.44] 
log Population (-2) 11.151*** 12.354*** 10.645*** 10.409*** 12.180*** 
 
[8.24] [8.85] [7.91] [7.72] [8.68] 
Unemployment (-2) 0.005 0.012 0.023 0.018 0.003 
 [0.25] [0.63] [1.21] [0.99] [0.16] 
Log Unemployment spending (-2) -0.131 -0.207** -0.14 -0.161 -0.122 
 [1.39] [2.13] [1.45] [1.64] [1.30] 
Union density (-2) -0.007 0.006 -0.008 -0.009 -0.002 
 [1.17] [0.79] [1.21] [1.38] [0.26] 
GDP growth (-2) -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
 [2.12] [2.74] [3.14] [2.70] [2.57] 
Left-wing government (-2) 0.109 0.146* 0.06 0.089 0.109 
 [1.25] [1.69] [0.69] [1.02] [1.28] 
Globalization (-2) 0.029**     
 [2.45]     
Economic Glob. (-2)  -0.018** -0.01   
 
 [2.06] [1.11]   
Political Glob. (-2)  0.012**  0.010*  
 
 [2.14]  [1.66]  
Social Glob. (-2)  0.030***   0.024*** 
 
 [4.06]   [3.37] 
 
     
 
     
 
     
Observations 340 340 340 340 340 
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20 
R-squared (within) 0.48 0.5 0.47 0.47 0.49 
R-squared (overall) 0.4786 0.5029 0.4702 0.4729 0.4878 
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 
2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year fixed effects (not reported). 
Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006), political orientation of the 
government is measured by the continuous ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value 
of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  
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Table 3: Interaction between globalization and unemployment spending for regular 
employment 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log GDP (-2) -0.545 -0.619 -0.948*** -1.096*** -0.873** -0.837** 
 
[1.43] [1.63] [2.71] [3.07] [2.37] [2.28] 
log Population (-2) 2.354*** 2.201*** 2.251*** 2.133*** 2.717*** 2.749*** 
 
[5.29] [4.93] [5.03] [4.74] [5.97] [6.06] 
Unemployment (-2) 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 
[0.43] [0.72] [1.02] [0.67] [0.52] [0.56] 
Log Unemployment spending (-2) (centered) -0.060* -0.077** -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.049 -0.053* 
 
[1.92] [2.42] [3.02] [3.00] [1.51] [1.66] 
GDP growth (-2) 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 
 
[0.97] [1.17] [2.14] [2.27] [1.74] [1.71] 
Rightwing government (continuous) (-2) -0.086*** -0.075** -0.072** -0.059* -0.077** -0.068** 
 
[2.84] [2.47] [2.42] [1.94] [2.53] [2.21] 
Economic Glob. (-2) (centered) -0.011*** -0.009***     
 
[4.30] [2.89]     
Political Glob. (-2) (centered)   -0.006*** -0.008***   
 
  [3.17] [3.63]   
Social Glob. (-2) (centered)     -0.001 -0.002 
 
    [0.58] [0.91] 
globalization * log unemployment spending  -0.004**  -0.002*  -0.001 
  [1.97]  [1.94]  [1.02] 
       
Observations 385 385 385 385 385 385 
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 
R-squared (within) 0.3267 0.3344 0.3102 0.3178 0.2903 0.2926 
R-squared (overall) 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.29 0.29 
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 
2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year fixed effects (not reported). 
Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006), political orientation of the 
government is measured by the continuous ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value 
of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  
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Table 4: Interaction between globalization and unemployment spending for temporary 
employment 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log GDP (-2) 6.151*** 5.842*** 5.176*** 5.333*** 4.976*** 4.784*** 
 
[6.40] [5.96] [5.20] [5.43] [5.17] [4.95] 
log Population (-2) 10.736*** 10.489*** 10.605*** 10.747*** 11.475*** 11.088*** 
 
[8.75] [8.49] [8.63] [8.85] [9.48] [9.03] 
Unemployment (-2) 0.015 0.011 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.009 
 
[0.92] [0.65] [0.49] [0.42] [0.25] [0.58] 
Log Unemployment spending (-2) (centered) -0.148* -0.146* -0.161* -0.182** -0.148* -0.189** 
 
[1.71] [1.69] [1.85] [2.11] [1.75] [2.16] 
GDP growth (-2) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
[4.75] [4.66] [3.85] [3.97] [3.67] [3.39] 
Rightwing government (continuous) (-2) 0.035 0.062 0.074 0.115 0.071 0.087 
 
[0.42] [0.74] [0.90] [1.39] [0.88] [1.07] 
Economic Glob. (-2) (centered) -0.012 -0.006     
 
[1.61] [0.72]     
Political Glob. (-2) (centered)   0.011** 0.005   
 
  [1.99] [0.90]   
Social Glob. (-2) (centered)     0.019*** 0.015** 
 
    [3.36] [2.51] 
globalization * log unemployment spending  -0.007  -0.010***  -0.004* 
 
 [1.50]  [3.18]  [1.73] 
 
      
Observations 385 385 385 385 385 385 
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 
R-squared (within) 0.445 0.4486 0.4472 0.4633 0.4589 0.4636 
R-squared (overall) 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 
 
      
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for temporarily employed workers (OECD, 
2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year fixed effects (not reported). 
Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006), political orientation of the 
government is measured by  the continuous ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value 
of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  
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Table 5: Interaction between globalization and government ideology for regular 
employment 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log GDP (-2) -0.948*** -1.053*** -0.873** -0.858** -1.203*** -1.185*** 
 
[2.71] [2.99] [2.37] [2.32] [3.30] [3.22] 
log Population (-2) 2.251*** 2.436*** 2.717*** 2.715*** 2.461*** 2.442*** 
 
[5.03] [5.36] [5.97] [5.96] [5.36] [5.29] 
Unemployment (-2) 0.006 0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 
[1.02] [0.92] [0.52] [0.50] [0.37] [0.35] 
Log Unemployment spending  
(-2) (centered) -0.095*** -0.091*** -0.049 -0.051 -0.069** -0.070** 
 
[3.02] [2.89] [1.51] [1.56] [2.17] [2.18] 
GDP growth (-2) 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 
 
[2.14] [2.47] [1.74] [1.68] [2.47] [2.38] 
Rightwing government  
(continuous) (-2) -0.072** -0.063** -0.077** -0.078** -0.063** -0.064** 
 
[2.42] [2.07] [2.53] [2.53] [2.04] [2.08] 
Economic Glob. (-2) (centered) -0.011*** -0.012***     
 
[4.30] [4.34]     
Political Glob. (-2) (centered)   -0.006*** -0.006***   
 
  [3.17] [3.18]   
Social Glob. (-2) (centered)     -0.001 -0.001 
 
    [0.58] [0.63] 
globalization * rightwing government  -0.007**  0.001  0.001 
 
 [2.08]  [0.42]  [0.50] 
 
      
Observations 385 385 385 385 385 385 
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 
R-squared (within) 0.3267 0.3352 0.3102 0.3106 0.2903 0.2909 
R-squared (overall) 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.29 
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 
2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year fixed effects (not reported). 
Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006), political orientation of the 
government is measured by the continuous ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value 
of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  
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Table 6: Interaction between globalization and government ideology for temporary 
employment 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log GDP (-2) 6.151*** 6.157*** 5.176*** 5.395*** 4.976*** 4.995*** 
 
[6.40] [6.33] [5.20] [5.43] [5.17] [5.16] 
log Population (-2) 10.736*** 10.725*** 10.605*** 10.571*** 11.475*** 11.455*** 
 
[8.75] [8.56] [8.63] [8.65] [9.48] [9.42] 
Unemployment (-2) 0.015 0.015 0.007 0.009 0.004 0.004 
 
[0.92] [0.92] [0.49] [0.59] [0.25] [0.26] 
Log Unemployment spending  
(-2) (centered) -0.148* -0.148* -0.161* -0.197** -0.148* -0.149* 
 
[1.71] [1.70] [1.85] [2.23] [1.75] [1.76] 
GDP growth (-2) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
[4.75] [4.69] [3.85] [4.12] [3.67] [3.66] 
Rightwing government  
(continuous) (-2) 0.035 0.034 0.074 0.072 0.071 0.069 
 
[0.42] [0.41] [0.90] [0.88] [0.88] [0.85] 
Economic Glob. (-2) (centered) -0.012 -0.012     
 
[1.61] [1.61]     
Political Glob. (-2) (centered)   0.011** 0.010*   
 
  [1.99] [1.85]   
Social Glob. (-2) (centered)     0.019*** 0.019*** 
 
    [3.36] [3.31] 
globalization * rightwing government  0  0.012**  0.001 
 
 [0.04]  [2.28]  [0.20] 
 
      
Observations 385 385 385 385 385 385 
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 
R-squared (within) 0.445 0.445 0.4472 0.4556 0.4589 0.4589 
R-squared (overall) 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for temporarily employed workers (OECD, 
2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year fixed effects (not reported). 
Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006), political orientation of the 
government is measured by  the continuous ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value 
of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
